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In my view, it is difficult to imagine a privilege that flows more
naturally from the purchase or rental of a dwelling than the privilege
of residing therein ....
-The Honorable Warren K. Urbom'
I. INTRODUCTION
For almost forty years, courts nationwide appeared to share Judge
Urbom's opinion, extending the protections of the Fair Housing Act to
* Articles and Comments Editor, University of Miami Law Review; J.D. Candidate 2012,
University of Miami School of Law; B.A. 2006, University of Central Florida. I would like to
thank my parents, Jonathan, and Joshua for their unwavering love and support. I would also like to
thank Professor David Abraham for his insight and guidance.
1. United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 976 (D. Neb. 2004).
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homeowners and home seekers alike. However, in 2004, the Seventh
Circuit pushed aside decades of precedent when it decided Halprin v.
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n 2 and held that
discrimination occurring after the purchase or rental of a dwelling is not
actionable under the Fair Housing Act. The decision opened up a circuit
court split, and its aftermath dismayed fair housing advocates. Relying
on Halprin, district courts' and one other federal appellate court4 swiftly
dismissed cases from homeowners and tenants claiming post-acquisition
discrimination.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals adhered to Halprin when it
decided Bloch v. Frischholz.' In Bloch, the court held that harassment of
a Jewish family by their condominium association did not give rise to a
cause of action under the Fair Housing Act because the conflict occurred
after the Blochs purchased their units. However, on rehearing en banc,
the Seventh Circuit changed course, reversing the earlier decision and
partially overruling Halprin.6 In the en banc opinion, the court declared
that the Fair Housing Act can indeed reach post-acquisition
discrimination.'
This note argues that the Fair Housing Act's protections should
cover pre- and post-acquisition discrimination alike. It provides an
examination of the Fair Housing Act as it relates to post-acquisition dis-
crimination and an analysis of case law on the issue. Part II examines the
history and purpose of the Fair Housing Act. Part III sets forth the rele-
vant Fair Housing Act provisions. Parts IV-V summarize pre-Halprin
case law and the Halprin decision. Part VI explores the aftermath of
Halprin. Part VII details the Bloch I-II decisions. Finally, Part VIII ana-
lyzes whether the Bloch II decision will repair the damage done by Hal-
prin, concluding that further action from Congress or the Supreme Court
is necessary to fully secure fair housing rights.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT (FHA)
A. Historical Perspective
Between 1910 and 1970, African Americans relocated from the
2. 388 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 2004).
3. See, e.g., Krieman v. Crystal Lake Apartments Ltd. P'ship, No. 05 C 0348, 2006 WL
1519320 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 2006); Jones v. South Bend Hous. Auth., No. 3:08-CV-596, 2009 WL
1657466 (N.D. Ind. June 10, 2009).
4. See Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1130 (2006).
5. 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008).
6. Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch II), 587 F.3d 771, 782 (7th Cir. 2009) (en banc).
7. Id. at 772.
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South to the North in massive numbers." This movement, which became
known as the Great Migration, was spurred by several factors. Techno-
logical developments in the automobile and appliance industries created
employment opportunities in the North, while demand for African
American farmworkers declined in the South.' Furthermore, black
Southerners struggled with oppressive social and political conditions.'
Unemployed and besieged by discrimination, around 877,000 African
Americans relocated to the North during the 1920s alone." The Great
Depression slowed migration in the 1930s, but by the close of the dec-
ade, another 400,000 African Americans had left the South.' 2 Over the
next three decades, close to 4.38 million African Americans headed
north or west, often to "the consternation of the middle-and-working-
class whites already living in those regions."13
Once resettled in the North, African Americans lived in poor, urban
areas and worked low-paying, industrial jobs." White Northerners were
suddenly forced to compete for employment and affordable housing, and
race relations in northern cities went from "mostly harmonious to
strained or even hostile."" In cities such as Detroit, black families who
moved into all-white neighborhoods suffered attacks ranging from burn-
ing crosses to broken windows.1 6 Construction of highways and
increased automobile usage gradually made it easier for white city work-
ers to live in surrounding areas and commute to work.17 As city schools
were desegregated and violence broke out, white families relocated to
suburbs, while black residents stayed behind in slum-like neighbor-
hoods." Additionally, federally-funded highway projects often dis-
placed city residents.' 9 In some instances, highway construction projects
"intentionally removed minorities from particular neighborhoods and
segregated them into others."2 0 Poor African American residents faced
exceptional difficulty securing affordable housing, and had little choice
8. CHARLES M. LAMB, HOusINGr SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960:
PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 26-27 (2005).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 28.
15. Id.
16. Thomas J. Sugrue, Op-Ed, A Dream Still Deferred, N.Y. TIMs, March 26, 2011, at
WKl 1.
17. LAMB, supra note 8, at 13.
18. Id. at 28.
19. Id. at 13.
20. Id.
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but to remain in overcrowded, predominantly black neighborhoods. 2'
Furthermore, under the guise of "federal urban renewal," the United
States frequently destroyed decaying African American neighborhoods,
replacing them with inadequate public housing.2 2 Local authorities con-
sciously assigned public housing on a segregated basis, sometimes "cre-
ating racial segregation in housing where it did not exist before."2 3 Some
federal courts held that these policies were unconstitutional.24 However,
the "renewal" continued into the 1960s.25
B. Fair Housing Legislation Takes Shape
During the 1950s, Texas Senator Lyndon B. Johnson opposed a
variety of civil rights measures. He objected to voting rights and anti-
lynching legislation, supported poll taxes, and publicly spoke out against
forced integration.2 6 However, as public opinion "grew more sympa-
thetic to the plight of African Americans in the South," Johnson softened
his positions, becoming one of the few Southern politicians to support
the Civil Rights Act of 1957.27 As vice president in the Kennedy
Administration, Johnson chaired the President's Committee on Equal
Employment Opportunity.2 8 When Johnson became president following
John F. Kennedy's assassination, he advocated civil rights in America,
supporting the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of
1965.29 These landmark laws prohibited private as well as public dis-
crimination in crucial areas such as employment and education. How-
ever, they did not address the housing discrimination that so many
African Americans were facing.30 In his 1964 State of the Union
address, President Johnson vowed to abolish racial discrimination,
including housing discrimination.3 ' Congress initially rejected the presi-
dent's proposals.32 Some states attempted to fill in the gaps; by 1968,
twenty-one states and the District of Columbia had passed legislation
barring discrimination in either or both the sale and rental of housing.
21. Id. at 13-14.
22. Id. at 14.
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., Detroit Housing Commission v. Lewis, 226 F.2d 180 (6th Cir. 1955) (holding
that the intentional segregation of public housing projects was unconstitutional and violated
federal law).
25. LAMB, supra note 8, at 15.
26. Id. at 29.
27. Id. at 30.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 31.
31. President Lyndon B. Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 8, 1964).
32. LAMB, supra note 8, at 31.
33. Id. at 32.
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Many states, however, remained silent. The states' patchwork efforts
demonstrated the need for uniform, federal fair housing legislation.
In January of 1966, President Johnson sent his first fair housing bill
to Congress.34 Although the bill garnered a few supporters, most Sena-
tors and members of Congress vocally opposed it.35 In 1967, another fair
housing bill, S. 1358,36 was introduced at committee hearings, where it
quickly died. Undaunted, President Johnson continued to campaign for
fair housing legislation, reaching out to both legislators and the public."
His efforts decreased his popularity, as white Americans were "voic[ing]
concerns over the speed and aggressiveness of the civil rights move-
ment" and the urban riots that took place throughout the last several
years of the decade.39 But the President persisted, arguing that African
Americans' poor living conditions and overcrowded neighborhoods had
a negative effect on the country at large.40 In the beginning of 1968,
President Johnson gave a civil rights address in which he explained that
housing discrimination concentrated minorities in cities, leading to
increased crime rates, poverty, and a lack of educational and employ-
ment opportunities for African Americans.4 1 The President outlined leg-
islation that would help assuage these problems, recommending that a
fair housing bill:
- Outlaw discriminatory practices in the financing of housing, and in
the services of real estate brokers.
- Bar the cynical practice of block-busting, and prohibit intimidation
of persons seeking to enjoy the rights [the law] grants and protects.
- Give responsibility for enforcement to the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development and authorize the attorney general to bring
suits against patterns and practices of housing discrimination.42
Over the next three years, President Johnson continued to push for
fair housing legislation, failing time and again to garner enough support
for the bill.4 3 But in 1968, three events occurred that led, finally and
quickly, to the bill's passage. First, Senate Minority Leader Everett
Dirksen (R-Ill.) "reversed his long standing-opposition to a national fair
34. Id. at 33.
35. Id. at 33-34.
36. 90th Cong. (1967).
37. Rigel C. Oliveri, Is Acquisition Everything? Protecting the Rights of Occupants Under the
Fair Housing Act, 43 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 26 (2008).
38. LAMB, supra note 8, at 34.
39. Id. at 34.
40. Id. at 35.
41. Id. at 39.
42. Special Message to the Congress on Civil Rights, 1 PuB. PAPERS. 189 (Jan 24. 1968),
available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edulws/index.php?pid=28871&st=block-busting&stl=#
axzzlKMX3oOt8.
43. LAMB, supra note 8, at 40.
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housing law and agreed to a compromise," a move Senator Walter
Mondale (D-Minn.) called miraculous." Second, the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders (nicknamed the Kerner Commission),
created by President Johnson in 1967, released a report examining the
reasons behind the 1967 and 1968 urban riots.4 5 The report concluded
that racial segregation in housing was causing urban violence and
gravely threatening American society.4 6 The Kerner Commission urged
Congress to pass fair housing legislation. Third, Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. was assassinated.4 8 Less than two weeks after the Kerner Com-
mission's report was released, the Senate passed the bill that became the
Fair Housing Act. 4 9 As riots raged in Washington, D.C., the House of
Representatives passed the bill on April 11, 1968, just one day after Dr.
King, Jr. was laid to rest."o The following day, President Johnson signed
the Fair Housing Act into law."1
C. Legislative History
Although President Johnson pushed for the statute's enactment for
years, the final version of the bill was passed quickly, in a chaotic month
during which Congress was under intense political pressure. Just three
days after the release of the Kerner report, the Senate voted cloture on a
filibuster that was blocking the bill.52 Furthermore, the House of Repre-
sentatives was allowed just one hour of debate on the bill." As Profes-
sor Rigel C. Oliveri notes, "the final version of the bill that became the
FHA was never considered by committee, and no formal reports
explaining its terms exist."54 Congress did not discuss interpretation of
the statute's language. 5 Committee hearings and floor debates centered
mostly on whether Congress had the power to enact the bill and the
scope of exemptions to the law's coverage, respectively.56 In addition,
"no specific discussion addresse[d] whether to interpret the FHA as
44. Id. The compromise placed most of the bill's enforcement powers in the Attorney
General's hands, rather than with the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Id.
45. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1968).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. LAMB, supra note 8, at 41.
49. H.R. 2516, 90th Cong. (1968).
50. Oliveri, supra note 37, at 27.
51. LAMB, supra note 8, at 43.
52. Oliveri, supra note 37, at 27.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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applicable to post-acquisition housing" discrimination." As a result,
Oliveri asserts, the Fair Housing Act's legislative history provides little
insight into the meaning of the bill's substantive terms.5 1 Professor Rob-
ert G. Schwemm echoes this conclusion, noting that "[d]ue to the haste
that characterized passage of the FHA . . . its legislative history pro-
duced little useful material concerning the proper interpretation of its
substantive provisions."" Thus, the bill's legislative history does not
resolve the question of whether Congress intended the Fair Housing Act
to apply to post-acquisition housing discrimination.
III. PROVISIONS OF THE FAIR HOUSING ACT AND ACCOMPANYING
REGULATIONS THAT RELATE TO POST-AcQuisITION
DISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court made clear that the FHA
carries out "a policy that Congress considered to be of the highest prior-
ity" and that its "broad and inclusive" language should be given "a gen-
erous construction."60 It is therefore important to examine relevant FHA
provisions under this broad, inclusive framework.
The first section of the Fair Housing Act declares that "[i]t is the
policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations,
for fair housing throughout the United States." 61 The majority of the
FHA focuses on administration and enforcement. 62 The provisions that
are most relevant to post-acquisition discrimination are 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604, which focuses on "[d]iscrimination in the sale or rental of hous-
ing and other prohibited practices," and 42 U.S.C. § 3617, which
addresses coercion, interference, and intimidation directed at persons
who exercise their fair housing rights. 6 3 42 U.S.C. § 3605 also encom-
passes post-acquisition conduct. Of the six 42 U.S.C. § 3604 subsec-
tions, (a), (b), and (c) are potentially applicable to post-acquisition
causes of action."
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services Under the
Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717 (2008).
60. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1972). In Trafficante, the
Supreme Court gave "standing to sue to all in the same housing unit who are injured by racial
discrimination in the management of those facilities within the coverage of the [FHA]." Id. at 212.
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2006).
62. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 3608, 3610, 3612-14 (2006).
63. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617 (2006).
64. U.S.C. § 3604(d) prohibits falsely representing to a person, because of a protected ground,
that a dwelling is unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(e) makes it unlawful to induce or try to induce a
person to sell or rent a dwelling "by representations regarding the entry . . . of a person" falling
into a protected category. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) details protections for handicapped persons.
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A. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (§ 3604(a))
§ 3604(a) prohibits refusal "to sell or rent ... or to refuse to negoti-
ate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial sta-
tus, or national origin." 65 In pre-acquisition cases, § 3604(a) is invoked
where a plaintiff claims to have been subjected to, for instance, racial
steering. 6 6 In post-acquisition claims, § 3604(a) becomes relevant when
an aggrieved homeowner or tenant claims that harassment or discrimina-
tion has essentially made the dwelling unavailable to him, despite his
already residing in it. For example, a plaintiff may assert that he or she
has been actually67 or constructively68 evicted from housing.
B. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (§ 3604(b))
§ 3604(b) prohibits discrimination "in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services
or facilities in connection therewith," because of any of the six protected
grounds: "race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin."69
The section's pre-acquisition application is straightforward, barring
practices such as charging tenants of one race higher rent than tenants of
a different race. Determining whether § 3604(b) has any relevance to
post-acquisition discrimination claims has been a more controversial
matter. Courts and commentators have argued over the statute's lan-
guage and grammar, debating whether the "services or facilities" modi-
fied by "in connection therewith" applies to services or facilities in
connection with a dwelling itself or to services or facilities in connection
only with the sale or rental of a dwelling. The former interpretation
would lend applicability of the statute to post-acquisition claims; the lat-
ter to pre-acquisition cases only. Schwemm constructed a grammatical
diagram of the phrase and concluded that
65. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
66. See, e.g., Heights Cmty. Congress v. Hilltop Realty, Inc., 774 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1985)
(affirming the trial court's decision that a realty company's agents violated § 3604(a) by
deliberately sending black customers to black-owned available homes only); United States v.
Space Hunters, Inc., 429 F.3d 416 (2d Cir. 2005) (allowing the plaintiff to go forward with a
§ 3604(a) claim where the defendant admitted to "steer[ing] prospective tenants to rooms on the
basis of race."); Spencer v. Conway, No. CV 00-350GLTEJ, 2001 WL 34366573, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
July 5, 2001) (holding that it is a violation of § 3604(a) "for an apartment owner to instruct
residential managers not to rent to minority applicants, even if no further discriminatory action is
taken as a result of the instruction.").
67. See, e.g., Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates, 736 F.2d 983 (4th Cir. 1984).
68. See, e.g., Stackhouse v. DeSitter, 620 F. Supp. 208 (N.D. Ill. 1985). Constructive eviction
occurs when a landlord's wrongful act renders premises useless to a tenant, causing the tenant to
abandon the premises. See generally 49 AM. JUR. 2D LANDLORD AND TENANT § 515 (2006).
69. 42. U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006).
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[F]rom a grammatical standpoint, neither "a dwelling" nor "the sale
or rental of a dwelling" is the target for § 3604(b)'s "therewith"
clause; rather, "therewith" refers to the phrase "in the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges." This is an adverbial prepositional phrase
describing how one discriminates under § 3604(b), while both "a
dwelling" and the "sale or rental of a dwelling" are prepositional
phrases that further explain what types of "terms, conditions, and
privileges" discrimination are prohibited. In other words, the phrase
"of sale or rental of a dwelling" is itself comprised of two modifying
prepositional phrases, and thus the "thing" referenced by the "there-
with" clause is discrimination in the entire phrase "terms, conditions,
or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling." 70
This grammatically correct reading, concluded Schwemm, does not
aid in interpreting § 3604(b)'s "services or facilities in connection there-
with" clause, "which clearly was intended by Congress to add new types
of prohibited discrimination to the earlier prohibitions against 'terms,
conditions, or privileges' discrimination."" Courts have therefore
employed both interpretations.72 Whichever interpretation a court
chooses, noted Schwemm, "its choice cannot be defended on the basis of
correct grammar, as Judge Higginbotham" tried to do in Cox."7 4
Instead, "the choice must turn on what Congress intended substan-
tively."" As noted earlier, however, there is little legislative history
available to help resolve the issue.
C. 42 U.S.C. 3604(c) (§ 3604(c))
§ 3604(c) prohibits making, printing, or publishing "any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwell-
ing" that expresses a preference based on a protected class.76 Violations
of this section occur most frequently before acquisition, where, for
example, a seller advertises a property as being available to whites
only. 7 However, the statute has sometimes been invoked in cases of
post-acquisition discrimination. For instance, in Harris v. Itzhaki," the
court held that a landlord's agent's discriminatory statement to a white
tenant, overheard by an African American tenant, was actionable under
§ 3604(c).
70. Schwemm, supra note 59, at 770-71.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See infra Section VI.
74. Schwemm, supra note 59, at 770-71.
75. Id.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2006).
77. See, e.g, United States v. Hunter, 459 F.2d 205, 210 (4th Cir. 1972).
78. 183 F.3d 1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).
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D. 42 U.S.C. § 3605 (§ 3605)
§ 3605 addresses discrimination in residential real estate-related
transactions, barring discrimination in the "making or purchasing of
loans . . . for purchasing, constructing, improving, repairing, or main-
taining a dwelling."79 It is difficult to see how an argument could be
made that this section does not apply to post-acquisition discrimination.
As Judge Urbom noted in United States v. Koch,80 § 3605 demonstrates
that, in enacting the FHA, "Congress was not unconcerned with the need
to prevent discrimination that might arise during a person's occupancy
of a dwelling.""
E. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (§ 3617)
§ 3617 makes it unlawful to "coerce, intimidate, threaten, or inter-
fere with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of, or on account of
his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by"
§§ 3603-3606.82 This portion of the FHA has also been the focus of
much debate. Scholars, courts, and commentators have debated the
meaning of the section, attempting to discern whether a cause of action
under § 3617 can exist even where no violation of §§ 3603-3606
occurs.13 The Bloch II decision emphatically stated that a § 3617 cause
of action can exist independent of a violation of the other FHA
84provisions.
F. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) Regulations
The Fair Housing Act gave HUD the "authority and responsibility"
to administer the FHA's provisions." The Department is responsible for
implementing regulations that interpret the Fair Housing Act. Under
Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Council,86 these formal
regulations are generally entitled to deference by courts, as long as
Chevron's two criteria are met. First, the court must first decide whether
79. 42 U.S.C. § 3605(b)(1)(A) (2006) (emphasis added).
80. United States v. Koch, 352 F. Supp. 2d 970, 977 (D. Neb. 2004).
81. Id.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a) (2006).
83. Compare United States v. Hayward, 36 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that a
§ 3617 claim could involve a situation "where no discriminatory housing practice may have
occurred at all . . . ."), with Frazier v. Rominger, 27 F.3d 828, 834 (2d Cir. 1994) (asserting that
§ 3617 prohibits "the interference with the exercise of Fair Housing rights" only as enumerated in
§§ 3603-3606).
84. See infra Section VII.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 3608(a) (2006).
86. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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Congress "has directly spoken to the precise question at issue."" If so,
the court (and the agency) must give effect to Congress's intent." If
Congress's intent is ambiguous, the court "does not simply impose its
own construction on the statute."" Rather, the court merely decides if
the agency's interpretation of the statute is "permissible.""o
1. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2)
24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) forbids "[t]hreatening, intimidating or
interfering with persons in their enjoyment of a dwelling because of the
race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin of
such persons . . . ."" This regulation has also been the subject of much
discussion, because it obviously reaches post-acquisition conduct. A
buyer or renter cannot, of course, begin to enjoy a dwelling until he or
she has actually moved into it. Thus, courts and commentators have
pointed to the regulation in support of the argument that the FHA covers
post-acquisition discrimination.
2. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(B)(4)
24 C.F.R. § 1OO.65(b)(4) prohibits "[1]imiting the use of privileges,
services or facilities associated with a dwelling because of race, color,
religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin of an owner,
tenant or a person associated with him or her."9 2 Again, the agency
interpreting the FHA clearly contemplated post-acquisition discrimin-
ation and accordingly extended the statute's protections to owners and
tenants.
IV. PRE-HALPRIN CASE LAW
Before Halprin" was decided, decisions on post-acquisition dis-
crimination generally fell into two categories. Some courts simply heard
the cases without ever specifically addressing the post-acquisition issue.
These cases seemed to implicitly accept that the claims were actionable,
despite the harassment's or conflict's occurring after the plaintiffs had
moved in. For example, in Campbell v. City of Berwyn,94 the plaintiffs
alleged that they received inferior police protection for their home based
87. Id. at 843.
88. Id. at 843-44.
89. Id. at 844.
90. Id.
91. 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) (1989) (emphasis added).
92. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4) (1989) (emphasis added).
93. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 208 F. Supp. 2d 896,
898 (N.D. Ill. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded by 388 F.3d 327 (7th. Cir. 2004).
94. 815 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
I
2012] 505
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
on their race.95 The court considered their claims under §§ 3604 and
3617 without first addressing whether the statutes applied post-
acquisition.96
Other courts deliberately addressed whether the FHA applied to
post-acquisition claims, usually answering the question in the affirma-
tive. For example, in Concerned Tenants Ass'n v. Indian Trails Apts.,"
the court rejected the defendants' argument that § 3604(b) applied only
to the availability of housing." Such a "tortured interpretation," asserted
the court, ran counter to the "plain and unequivocal language of the stat-
ute." 99 In Hous. Rights Ctr. v. Donald Sterling Corp.,'I minority renters
complained of discriminatory mistreatment by their landlord.'01 Among
their complaints was an allegation that, based on their nationality, the
landlord attempted to deny the renters use of a parking garage amen-
ity.102 In no uncertain terms, the court declared that "a discriminatory
statement made with respect" to the provision of services or facilities
offered in connection with a home "violates § 3604(c), even if not made
at the moment of first sale or rental."' In United States v. Pospisil,'"
the court held that a post-acquisition § 3617 violation could occur absent
a substantive violation of §§ 3603-3606.10- Refusing to recognize inde-
pendent § 3617 claims, explained the court, would render the section
redundant and conflict with the HUD regulations.106
V. THE HALPRIN CASE
A. Facts
Rick Halprin, a Jewish man, and his wife, Robyn, owned a home in
a suburb of Chicago, Illinois.'" The Halprins' subdivision was managed
by a homeowners' association (HOA), which was responsible for man-
95. Id. at 1141.
96. See also Landesman v. Keys Condomium Owners Ass'n, No. C 04-2685 PJH, 2004 WL
2370638, at *1, *4 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 2004) (enjoining condominium association from
discriminatorily barring plaintiffs from use of a common pool, without first considering whether
the FHA applied to post-acquisition claims).
97. 496 F. Supp. 522 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
98. Id. at 525.
99. Id.
100. 274 F. Supp. 2d 1129 (C.D. Cal. 2003).
101. Id. at 1141.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 1142.
104. 127 F. Supp. 2d 1059 (W.D. Mo. 2000).
105. Id. at 1063.
106. Id.
107. See Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 208 F. Supp. 2d
896, 898 (N.D. Ill. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, remanded by 388 F.3d 327 (7th. Cir. 2004).
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aging and providing services to the neighborhood's occupants.10 8 The
Halprins alleged that the HOA board's president, Mark Ormond,
engaged in anti-semitic behavior toward them, including painting "H-
town property" (short for the derogatory epithet "Hymie Town") on a
wall on the Halprins' property.o 9 Furthermore, "a tape recording of a
board meeting at which the Halprins were discussed" was destroyed, and
the meeting's minutes were altered." 0 The Halprins also claimed that
Ormond vandalized their property."' Additionally, Ormond blocked
Robyn Halprin's efforts to address the HOA's board regarding manage-
ment of the Association.1 12 The Halprins sued Ormond, the HOA, and
other members of the board, alleging violations of Fair Housing Act
§§ 3604 and 3617."1 The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). 114 The trial court granted the motion,
based on the fact that the defendants' alleged conduct took place after
the Halprins bought their home."s The Halprins appealed.
B. Decision
In an opinion written by Judge Posner, the Seventh Circuit affirmed
in part and reversed in part." 6 The court ignored the Halprins' § 3604(c)
claim,1' 7 stating early in the opinion that the only FHA provisions that
were "possibly relevant here" were §§ 3604(a)-(b) and § 3617."'
Regarding § 3604, Judge Posner proclaimed that "[tihe Fair Housing
Act contains no hint either in its language or its legislative history of a
concern with anything but access to housing."ll9 The Halprins,
explained the court, were "complaining not about being prevented from
acquiring property but about being harassed by other property own-
ers."120 Under this interpretation of the statute, the Halprins' § 3604
108. See id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 898-99.
111. Id. at 898.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 899.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 902-03.
116. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 331 (7th
Cir. 2004).
117. Oliveri criticized Judge Posner's decision to not consider the Halprins' § 3604(c) claim,
arguing that "[g]iven § 3604(c)'s prohibition of discriminatory notices and statements, and the
allegation that one defendant painted a religious slur on the plaintiffs' property, this conclusion is
certainly wrong." Oliveri, supra note 37, at 17 n.89.
118. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 328.
119. Id. at 329.
120. Id.
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claims were swiftly dismissed.12 '
Fortunately for the Halprins, the court grudgingly reinstated their
§ 3617 claim.' 2 2 The court cited to 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2), which
forbids interference with "enjoyment of a dwelling," noting that this lan-
guage "cuts section 3617 loose from section 3604 .... "123 Judge Posner
questioned the HUD regulation's validity, stating that it "may stray too
far from section 3617 . . . to be valid." 24 However, because the defend-
ants had not challenged it, the regulation's "possible invalidity ha[d]
been forfeited as a ground upon which we might affirm the district
court." 25 As Schwemm noted, "the clear implication of this part of Hal-
prin is that in future cases brought by current residents, defendants may
challenge the HUD regulation, and, if successful, defeat a post-acquisi-
tion interference claim under § 3617."126
Judge Posner did concede that some post-acquisition discrimination
might be reached by the statute. He wrote that "[als a purely semantic
matter the statutory language might be stretched far enough to reach a
case of 'constructive eviction' . . . ."127 For example, he suggested, burn-
ing down someone's house would succeed in making it unavailable.128
However, less extreme (but still insidious) post-acquisition discrimina-
tion would simply not be actionable under the FHA.
VI. THE AFTERMATH OF HALPRIN
Courts were quick to react to the Halprin decision. Some district
court judges relied on the Seventh Circuit's reasoning to dismiss post-
acquisition discrimination claims.129 For example, in one Florida case,
an African American couple claimed that a neighbor was harassing them
based on their race.13' The couple sued their homeowners' association,
arguing that the association failed to act against the neighbor, even
though the neighbor's conduct violated community rules.' 31 Citing to
Halprin, the court dismissed the claim, noting that the "alleged discrimi-
natory conduct was not related to the sale or rental of the plaintiffs'
121. Id. at 330.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Schwemm, supra note 59, at 728.
127. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
128. See id.
129. See, e.g., AHF Cmty. Dev., LLC v. City of Dallas, 633 F. Supp. 2d 287 (N.D. Tex. 2009)
(questioning whether even constructive eviction could give rise to a § 3604(a) claim).
130. See Lawrence v. Courtyards at Deerwood Ass'n, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1133, 1138 (S.D. Fla.
2004).
131. Id.
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dwelling . . . ."132 Other courts have grappled with the status of 24
C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2), since Judge Posner's opinion in Halprin ques-
tioned the regulation's validity.'33
The most prominent decision to follow Halprin came from the
Fifth Circuit in Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas.' 3  The Cox plaintiffs
alleged that Dallas violated FHA §§ 3604(a)-(b) by consistently failing
to stop the operation of an illegal dump in a predominantly African
American neighborhood.' The court dismissed the § 3604(a) claim,
explaining that the statute's language "does not apply to current home-
owners whose complaint" is focused on habitability, rather than availa-
bility.'16 The court did note, however, that § 3604(a) could reach an
actual or constructive eviction case.' 37 The court also took a narrow
view when it addressed the plaintiffs' § 3604(b) claim. "[A]ssuming that
the enforcement of zoning laws alleged here is a 'service,"' explained
Judge Higginbotham, § 3604(b) was inapplicable because the service
was not "'connected' to the sale or rental of a dwelling . ... "'" The
court asserted that such a reading of the section was "grammatically
superior."l 39 Unfortunately for renters and owners in the Fifth Circuit's
jurisdiction, Cox appears to foreclose any potential claims for discrimi-
nation in the provision of municipal services, such as police protection
and garbage collection. 4 0
However, not all post-Halprin courts rushed to limit FHA protec-
tions. In United States v. Koch,14 ' Judge Urbom expressly rejected the
Seventh Circuit's reasoning and held that a landlord's sexual harassment
of his tenants gave rise to a cause of action under the FHA.14 2 In The
Comm. Concerning Cmty. Improvement v. City of Modesto,"' the court
discussed both Halprin and Bloch I and succinctly concluded that "the
FHA reaches post-acquisition discrimination."' 4  Modesto involved
132. Id. at 1143.
133. See, e.g., George v. Colony Lake Prop. Owners Ass'n, No. 05 C 5899, 2006 WL
1735345, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 16, 2006) (noting that Halprin "raised a question as to the validity"
of the regulation, but did not ultimately rule on the issue); Reule v. Sherwood Valley I Council of
Co-Owners, Inc., No. Civ.A. H-05-3197, 2005 WL 2669480, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2005)
(adopting "the Seventh Circuit view that 24 C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2) is invalid.").
134. 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1130 (2006).
135. See id. at 736.
136. Id. at 741.
137. Id. at 742.
138. Id. at 745.
139. Id.
140. For a detailed analysis of Halprin's effect on discrimination in municipal service
provisions, see Schwemm, supra note 59.
141. 352 F. Supp. 2d 970 (D. Neb. 2004).
142. Id. at 980.
143. 583 F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 2009).
144. Id. at 713.
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residents of a predominantly Hispanic neighborhood who claimed the
city discriminated against them in the provision of municipal services.145
The court explained that § 3604(b)'s use of the word "privileges" impli-
cated "continuing rights, such as the privilege of quiet enjoyment of a
dwelling." 1 6 The court referred to the grammatical debate,1 17 conclud-
ing that the narrower interpretation "is hardly a necessary reading."1 4 8
Under what it called a "natural reading," the court argued that "the reach
of the statute encompasses claims regarding services or facilities per-
ceived to be wanting after the owner or tenant has acquired possession
of the dwelling.""' The court also cited to 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(4)150
in support of its conclusion.'
VII. THE BLOCH CASE
A. Facts
Lynne, Helen, and Nathan Bloch owned three units and were long-
time residents at Shoreline Towers, a Chicago condominium building.15 2
Lynne, who is Helen and Nathan's mother, was serving on Shoreline
Towers' condominium board when it enacted a series of hallway
rules."' Hallway Rule 1 forbade the placement of "[m]ats, boots, shoes,
carts or objects of any sort . . . outside Unit entrance doors."' 5 4 The
Blochs, who are Jewish, each had a mezuzah affixed to their door-
posts.' 55 A mezuzah is a small scroll of parchment, inside a cover or
case, on which certain biblical passages are handwritten.156 The mezu-
zah reminds Jews of their faith, and symbolizes God's "watchful care
over the house and its dwellers.""' The Torah commands Jews to "place
these words of Mine upon your heart and upon our soul . . . and write
them on the doorposts of your house and upon your gates . . . ."1" When
entering their homes, it is customary for Jewish persons to touch the
145. Id. at 696.
146. Id. at 713.
147. See supra Section II.B.
148. Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713.
149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. See supra Section f.F.1.
151. Modesto, 583 F.3d at 713-14 (emphasis added).
152. Bloch v. Frischholz (Bloch 1), 533 F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2008) (Wood, J., dissenting),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, remanded en banc by 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 566.
156. Dovid Zaklikowski, What is a Mezuzah - Handbook, CHABAD.ORG, http://www.
chabad.org/library/article-c3do/aid/256915/jewish/What-Is-a-Mezuzah.htm (last visited Sept. 3,
2011).
157. Id.
158. Deuteronomy 11:13-21.
510 [Vol. 66:495
ON SECOND THOUGHT
mezuzah and kiss their fingertips.159 The Torah urges Jews to follow this
ritual "so that you will prolong your days and the days of your children
"160
Hallway Rule 1 was enacted in 2001.161 The Blochs' mezuzotl 6 2
remained in place without objection until 2004, when the family
removed their mezuzot to comply with the condominium's hallway ren-
ovation plan.163 Once the work was completed, the Blochs reaffixed
their mezuzot to the outer doorposts of their units.'" Only then did the
defendants begin "removing and confiscating the mezuzot, without
notice to the Blochs and without their permission." Despite having
never used Hallway Rule 1 to remove mezuzot in the past, the defend-
ants relied on the rule as they continued confiscating the Blochs'
mezuzot.166 The family provided information to the condominium asso-
ciation detailing the importance of the mezuzah in their religion. The
confiscation, however, continued.' 67 The condominium association even
threatened the Blochs with a fine if they continued to display their
mezuzot.' 6
During the conflict with the condominium association, Lynne
Bloch's husband, Dr. Marvin Bloch, passed away. 16 9 While the grieving
family prepared to sit shiva,' their lawyer contacted the condomin-
ium's board and asked that the Blochs' mezuzot not be removed during
the seven-day shiva period.' In a shocking display of insensitivity, the
defendants waited until the family was attending Dr. Bloch's funeral to
remove the Blochs' mezuzot.172 The mourners returned to their homes,
accompanied by a rabbi, to discover their mezuzot had been confiscated
again."73 Notably, the defendants did not confiscate a coat rack and card
table that had been placed near the Blochs' door for funeral guests to
use.174 Although these larger items were exactly the type of "hallway
159. Zaklikowski, supra note 156.
160. Deuteronomy 11:21.
161. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting).
162. Mezuzot is the plural form of mezuzah.
163. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Shiva is the traditional weeklong Jewish mourning period. MAURICE LAMM, THE JEWISH
WAY IN DEATH AND MOURNING 80-88 (2d ed. 2000).
171. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 567 (Wood, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 774.
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clutter" the condominium's rules sought to stamp out, they remained
untouched while the small mezuzot were taken down yet again."' Dur-
ing this time period, the defendants also removed the mezuzah of
another Jewish resident, Debra Gassman." 6
The defendants also displayed arguably anti-semitic behavior in
other conflicts with the Blochs. For example, Edward Frischholz, the
president of the condominium association board, admitted in deposition
that he purposely scheduled board meetings on Friday nights, despite
knowledge that Lynne Bloch could not attend due to the weekly Shab-
bat"' holiday."' When questioned about the schedule, he claimed that
Mrs. Bloch was "perfectly able" to attend, but chose not to do so. 179 Mr.
Frischholz made these claims despite being aware of Mrs. Bloch's com-
mitment to her religious practices."so
In September 2005, the Blochs sued Edward Frischholz and the
condominium association, seeking an "injunction and damages for dis-
tress, humiliation, and embarrassment."'"' In support of their claim, the
Blochs relied on three provisions of the Fair Housing Act, 18 2 along with
federal Civil Rights Act and state law theories.' After a magistrate
judge entered an order forbidding the defendants from confiscating the
mezuzot, the condominium board created an exception to Hallway Rule
1 for religious objects. 8 4 Several months later, likely in response to pub-
lic uproar created by these events,18 5 Chicago changed its municipal
code, prohibiting condos and rental properties from restricting the place-
ment of religious symbols on doorposts. 8 6 The state of Illinois also
175. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 569 (Wood, J., dissenting).
176. Id. Gassman, who initially thought she had been the victim of a hate crime, unsuccessfully
sued Mr. Frischholz and the condominium association for religious discrimination and breach of
fiduciary duty. See Gassman v. Frischholz, No. 05 C 5377, 2007 WL 1266291, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
April 30, 2007).
177. From sundown Friday until nightfall on Saturday, religious Jews partake in a day of rest,
during which work, business, and even the operation of electrical devices are forbidden. Shabbat
Rest - A Chance of Focus, CHABAD.ORG, http://www.chabad.org/library/article-cdo/aid/735409/
jewish/Shabbat-Rest.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
178. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 773.
179. Id. at 773-74.
180. Id. at 774.
181. Id.
182. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a), 3604(b), and 3617 (2006).
183. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 569 (Wood, J., dissenting). Under state law, the plaintiffs alleged
violations of the Illinois Condominium Act. See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants at 12, Bloch v.
Frischholz, 533 F.3d 562 (7th Cir. 2008) (No. 06-3376).
184. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 773.
185. See, e.g., Douglas Wertheimer, More Mezuzah Bans, CHI. JEWISH STAR, Aug. 19, 2005, at
1 (reporting outrage among Jewish Chicagoans and legislators over mezuzah bans and removal).
In addition to the ban in the Blochs' building, there were reports of mezuzah bans in at least two
other Chicago condominium buildings. See id.
186. CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE § 5-8-30(H) (2011).
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passed a law under its Condominium Property Act forbidding boards of
managers from adopting property rules that impair "the free exercise of
religion." 187 These changes made the Blochs' request for an injunction
moot, but they proceeded with their claim for damages on both federal
and state grounds."'
B. Majority Opinion
Over a dissent, a Seventh Circuit panel of judges affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants.18 9
Chief Judge Easterbrook noted that, under Halprin, "religiously moti-
vated harassment of owners or tenants does not violate the Fair Housing
Act or its regulations."'9 o However, Judge Easterbrook also wrote that
the defendants' actions did not amount to religious discrimination at
all.19' Rather, he called Hallway Rule 1 "neutral with respect to relig-
ion," both "as adopted in 2001 and as enforced in 2004."192 The court
noted that "[g]enerally applicable rules that do not refer to religion differ
from discrimination."'"9 The court interpreted the Blochs' actions as a
request for a religious exception to the rule, commenting that the plain-
tiffs were asking the court to "treat failure to make an accommodation as
a form of discrimination."19' The Fair Housing Act, noted the court,
requires accommodation for handicaps only, through 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604(f)(3)(b).195
C. Dissent
In a lengthy dissenting opinion, Judge Wood argued that the Blochs
were "raising a straightforward claim of intentional discrimination based
on their Jewish religion and ethnicity," rather than simply asking for a
religious accommodation.19 6 Judge Wood noted that the continued
removal of the mezuzot, particularly during the family's period of
mourning, would enable a trier of fact to find the condominium associa-
tion's actions were intentionally discriminatory."
Judge Wood reached her conclusions even under the narrow con-
fines of Halprin. The Blochs' case, she concluded, fell within the Sev-
187. 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 605/18.4(h) (2010).
188. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 774.
189. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 565.
190. Id. at 563.
191. Id. at 564.
192. Id. (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. Id. at 565.
195. Id.
196. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 566 (Wood, J., dissenting).
197. Id. at 571.
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enth Circuit's constricted interpretations of §§ 3604(a)-3604(b). Judge
Wood commented that the Blochs' case was secure under 3604(a), even
though Halprin interpreted that portion of the statute as applying solely
to the accessibility of housing." She reasoned that the inability to affix
a mezuzah in its proper place created "a constructive eviction for obser-
vant Jewish residents."' The condominium association, noted the
judge, "might as well hang a sign outside saying 'No observant Jews
allowed.'"20 In support of the constructive eviction theory, Judge Wood
noted that Debra Gassman did in fact move out because of the hallway
rule's reinterpretation, and that the Blochs would have moved had the
rule not been changed.2 01
Judge Wood also argued that the Blochs' case could go forward
under § 3604(b), which is concerned with discrimination in "the terms,
conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwelling."20 2 The judge
noted that although a narrow interpretation of the statute was possible,
nothing in its wording compelled the conclusion that it applies only to
pre-sale discrimination.2 0 3 She also cited to one of the statute's accom-
panying HUD regulations, which extends § 3604(b) protection to
tenants and owners (rather than merely housing seekers), noting that the
regulation is entitled to deference under Chevron, USA v. Natural
Resources Defense Council,2 05  "assuming Chevron's criteria are
met." 20 6 (Halprin questioned the validity of one HUD regulation, 24
C.F.R. § 100.400(c)(2), but ultimately left the issue undecided.) 2 0 7
D. Rehearing En Banc
Before the rehearing, the Seventh Circuit invited the United States
to participate as amicus curiae. The United States filed a brief urging the
court to hold that the FHA protects occupants from post-acquisition dis-
crimination. 208 The brief argued that "[n]othing in the statute indicates
198. Id. at 570.
199. Id. Judge Wood cited to letters from the Rabbinical Council of Chicago, the Decalogue
Society, and Rabbi Aron Wolf, all of which "stated that an observant Jew would be forced to
move if he or she was not allowed to affix a mezuzab." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2006).
203. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 571 (Wood, J., dissenting).
204. 24 C.F.R. § 100.65(b)(2) (1989).
205. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
206. Bloch 1, 533 F.3d at 571 (Wood, J., dissenting).
207. Halprin v. Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 330 (7th
Cir. 2004).
208. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiff-Appellants Urging
Reversal and Remand on Fair Housing Claims, Bloch v. Frischholz, 587 F.3d 771 (7th Cir. 2009)
(No. 06-3376), 2009 WL 601419.
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that it is limited to discrimination in the initial sale or rental
transaction."209
On rehearing en banc, the Court of Appeals stated that the case
presented two issues: whether the Blochs could seek relief under any
federal theories, and, if so, whether the family offered "sufficient evi-
dence of discrimination to proceed to trial" on any of their federal theo-
ries.210 With regard to the Blochs' FHA claims, the court noted that their
opinion in Halprin "left little room for a post-acquisition discrimination
claim."2 11 However, Judge Tinder cited to dicta in Halprin stating that
§ 3604(a) could potentially reach a constructive eviction case.2 12 A
homeowner or tenant, noted the court, could be denied the right to live
in a dwelling after he or she moves in.2 13 Prohibiting discrimination only
until a buyer or renter "signs on the dotted line . . . would only go
halfway toward ensuring availability of housing."214 In terms much
clearer than Halprin's hypothetical dicta, the court concluded that
§ 3604(a) "may reach post-acquisition discriminatory conduct that
makes a dwelling unavailable to the owner or tenant, somewhat like a
constructive eviction." 215 While the court noted that "constructive evic-
tion requires surrender of possession by the tenant," it refrained from
deciding whether "'unavailability' means that a plaintiff must, in every
case, vacate the premises" to raise a § 3604(a) claim. 2 16 As applied to
the Blochs, however, Judge Tinder stated that the evidence would not
allow a reasonable jury to conclude that the Blochs' units were unavaila-
ble, because the family remained in their condominiums throughout the
dispute.217 Thus, the court concluded that the Blochs could not proceed
under § 3604(a).21 8
Next, the court analyzed the Blochs' § 3604(b) theory. The court
noted that constructive eviction could give rise to a cause of action under
§ 3604(b), as well as § 3604(a), because the privileges of sale include
the right to inhabit the premises.219 However, the court recognized that
the Blochs' case implicated additional provisions of § 3604(b).2 20 Judge
Tinder noted that when the Blochs purchased their units, they agreed to
209. Id.
210. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 775-76.
211. Id. at 776.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 778.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 779.
220. Id.
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be governed by a condominium association.2 2 ' Such an agreement,
explained the court, was a term or condition of sale that brought the case
within the purview of § 3604(b), despite the agreement contemplating
post-acquisition governance.2 22 The court used this agreement to distin-
guish the case from Halprin, commenting that the defendants' conduct
in Halprin was not "linked to any of the terms, conditions, or privileges
that . . . were related to the plaintiffs' purchase of their property." 2 23
Because the Blochs agreed to be bound by the condominium board's
restrictions when they purchased their units, § 3604(b) prohibited the
condominium association from "discriminating against the Blochs
through its enforcement of the rules," even when those rules were
facially neutral.22 4 The court also emphasized that allowing particular
post-acquisition discrimination claims under § 3604(b) would be consis-
tent with HUD regulations.225
Although the court expressed the plausibility of post-acquisition
discrimination claims under §§ 3604(a)-(b), it did so within Halprin's
confines. However, when the court examined the Blochs' § 3617 claim,
one of Halprin's most damaging holdings was explicitly laid to rest.
§ 3617 prohibits interference with a person "in the exercise or enjoy-
ment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right
granted" by §§ 3603-3606 of the Fair Housing Act.2 26 The Blochs
argued that a § 3617 violation could occur even where a violation of the
other FHA provisions did not.22 7 Judge Tinder explained that the lack of
a constructive eviction, in violation of §§ 3604(a)-(b), did not "fore-
close the possibility that the defendants 'interfered' with the Blochs'
enjoyment of their § 3604 rights or 'coerced' or 'intimidated' the Blochs
on account of their having exercised those rights." 2 28 A different inter-
pretation, noted the court, would render § 3617 "entirely duplicative of
the other FHA provisions." 2 29 The court stated that Halprin's interpreta-
tion of § 3617 would limit the section's application to pre-sale interfer-
ence with FHA rights.23 0 Such an interpretation was contradictory to
Halprin's own recognition that prohibited conduct, such as discrimina-
tory evictions, could occur only after the sale or rental is complete.
Thus, the court overruled Halprin's § 3617 interpretation, agreeing with
221. Id.
222. Id. at 779-80.
223. Id. at 780.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 780-81.
226. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (2006).
227. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 781.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 782.
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the Blochs that "§ 3617 reaches a broader range of post-acquisition con-
duct." 23 1 Furthermore, a claim of a § 3617 violation "does not require
that the plaintiff actually vacate the premises."232 The court stated that
this interpretation was consistent with both HUD's interpretation of
§ 3617 and Congress's purpose in enacting the FHA.m The court also
agreed with Judge Wood's opinion that the Blochs were "not seeking an
exception to a neutral [hallway] rule," overruling Judge Easterbrook's
contrary finding.2 34 The court then remanded the case, stating that the
Blochs could proceed on an intentional discrimination theory under
§ 3604(b), § 3617, and the Civil Rights Act (42 U.S.C. 1982).23 The
court also reinstated the Blochs' state law claims.236
VIII. ANALYSIS
Halprin opened up a circuit court split that Bloch II has since nar-
rowed. Currently, only the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals maintains Hal-
prin and Bloch I's constricted interpretation of the Fair Housing Act.23 7
The Fifth Circuit relied on Halprin in deciding Cox v. City of Dallas,
Texas.2 38 Now that parts of Halprin are no longer good law, the Fifth
Circuit will undoubtedly be watched closely to see if it too will begin to
recognize a cause of action in post-acquisition housing discrimination. It
is unlikely that Bloch II will lead to a reversal of Cox's holding on
§ 3604(a). Cox held that § 3604(a) "gives no right of action to current
owners claiming that the value or 'habitability' of their property has
decreased due to discrimination in the delivery of protective city ser-
vices."23 9 Bloch II was in line with this reasoning, hinting that only con-
structive eviction, and not decreased habitability, could give rise to a
post-acquisition discrimination claim.2 4 0 The possibility remains, how-
ever, that Bloch II could influence the Fifth Circuit's future opinions on
post-acquisition § 3604(b) claims. The Cox court employed the narrow
interpretation of the section, applying it only to services connected to the
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 783.
235. Id. at 787.
236. Id. Because the district court originally granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants on each of the Blochs' federal claims, it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the plaintiffs' state law claims. Id. at 775.
237. See Cox v. City of Dallas, Texas, 430 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S.
1130 (2006).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 742-43.
240. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 777.
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sale or rental of a dwelling.241 Enforcement of zoning laws, reasoned the
court, was not such a service. 242 It is possible that the Seventh Circuit's
reconsideration of § 3604(b) could persuade the Fifth Circuit to
acknowledge that the rights current homeowners obtain by purchasing
their homes include "'services' or 'privileges' that are part and parcel of
those property rights," such as the right to have local zoning laws
enforced.24 3 A reconsideration of Cox under this framework would turn
the issue into "the one assumed away by the Fifth Circuit: that is,
whether the defendant's enforcement of its zoning law was a 'service' or
'privilege' under § 3604(b). The answer would clearly be 'yes' if the
targets of such zoning enforcement were the plaintiffs' own homes
. ... "244 Moreover, Cox did not consider whether § 3617 was applicable
to the case. Even if the Fifth Circuit maintains its narrow interpretation
of §§ 3604(a)-(b), Bloch II's wider application of § 3617 could influ-
ence the Fifth Circuit to consider post-acquisition discrimination cases
that are outside the purview of § 3604.
Bloch II also left open the question of whether a § 3604(a) violation
can occur if the claimants don't actually vacate the premises.245 In a
footnote, the court speculated that "a future case may require us to
reconsider our understanding of constructive eviction, depending on
how the Supreme Court treats the potentially analogous concept of con-
structive termination."24 6 The court noted that "[a]vailability, not simply
habitability, is the right that § 3604(a) protects."24 7
Although this interpretation is plausible, and the court did not give
a firm answer on whether a claim of "unavailability" requires a plaintiff
to move out, it dismissed the Blochs' § 3604(a) claim because they
never moved away.248 Asking harassed homeowners and tenants to
move out of their homes before they can have a cause of action under
§ 3604(a) is an extreme requirement that does not take into account the
myriad of difficulties a claimant would be forced to face.249 Moving out
may be financially impossible. It could impose severe hardships on eld-
241. Cox, 430 F.3d at 745.
242. Id.
243. Schwemm, supra note 59, at 779.
244. Id. at 788.
245. Id. at 778.
246. Id., n.6. The Fair Housing Act has drawn repeated comparisons to Title VII, which even
Judge Posner acknowledged "protects the job seeker as well as the job applicant." Halprin v.
Prairie Single Family Homes of Dearborn Park Ass'n, 388 F.3d 327, 329 (7th Cir. 2004).
247. Id. at 777.
248. Id. at 778.
249. The court acknowledged this in its discussion of § 3617, noting that "[riequiring the
Blochs to vacate their homes before they can sue undoubtedly stifles" the purpose of the Fair
Housing Act Id. at 782.
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erly plaintiffs or large families. Furthermore, a homeowner or tenant
may simply not want to give up his or her home. (Even for plaintiffs
who do move out, the Bloch II court recognized that "[p]roving con-
structive eviction is a tall order.")250 A broader interpretation of
"unavailable" could recognize that discrimination or harassment may
make a dwelling functionally unavailable to its occupants, while not
forcing a plaintiff to actually leave his home before a court will hear his
case.
Of course, a court would have to strike a balance to ensure that
"quarrels between neighbors [do] not become a routine basis for federal
litigation."25' Courts could achieve this balance by drawing analogies to
sexual harassment claims under Title VII, where a defendant's conduct
must create a hostile work environment before a claim arises.252 As the
Court noted in Meritor, not every offensive comment will "affect the
conditions of employment to sufficiently significant degree to violate
Title VII." 253 A court considering a post-acquisition discrimination
claim under § 3604(a) could reason that harassment may create a hostile
living environment that makes a dwelling functionally unavailable to its
occupant, without forcing that occupant to find new housing before hav-
ing standing to sue.254
The Bloch II court's interpretation of § 3604(b) was undoubtedly
more favorable to fair housing advocates. The court held that agreement
to be governed by a condominium association was a term or condition of
sale that brought the Blochs' case within the section's purview.255 The
court distinguished Bloch from Halprin, noting that "Halprin made it
clear that § 3604(b) is not broad enough to provide a blanket 'privilege'
to be free from all discrimination from any source."2 5 6 Bloch II does not
appear to allow for post-acquisition causes of action under the FHA
where the defendant's conduct is not linked to "any of the terms, condi-
tions, or privileges that accompanied or were related to the plaintiffs
purchase of their property."257 Moreover, the court did not recognize a
privilege of quiet enjoyment that could be encompassed by § 3604(b).
Therefore, the court's interpretation of the section does not seem to
250. Id. at 777.
251. Halprin, 388 F.3d at 329.
252. Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
253. Id.
254. The court did hold that conduct that does not lead to constructive eviction can still give
rise to a § 3617 claim; a broader interpretation of § 3604(a) may therefore seem unnecessary.
However, in circuits that do not recognize a § 3617 claim absent a violation of §§ 3603-3606, the
narrower construction of § 3604(a) could prevent plaintiffs from stating a cause of action.
255. Bloch II, 587 F.3d at 779-80.
256. Id. at 780.
257. Id.
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allow for protection of plaintiffs who are harassed by other occupants,
outside the scope of a homeowners' or condominium association. Bloch
II also did not address whether discrimination in the provision of munic-
ipal services is covered by § 3604(b). The court's wide interpretation of
§ 3617 may make a similarly generous interpretation of § 3604(b) seem
superfluous, but in circuits that require a §§ 3603-3606 violation before
a § 3617 violation can occur, a broader interpretation is necessary.
It is through its reinterpretation of § 3617 that Bloch II most signifi-
cantly repaired the damage done by Halprin. By broadening the sec-
tion's reach, the court acknowledged that a defendant can, without
violating §§ 3603-3606, discriminate against an occupant on account of
that occupant exercising his or her rights to fair housing.258 The court
made clear that a plaintiff can state a cause of action under § 3617 with-
out vacating the premises. 259 § 3604 prohibits discriminatory evictions,
observed the court, and "attempted discriminatory evictions can viola-
tion § 3617's prohibition against interference with § 3604 rights."26 0
Thus, Bloch II has paved a path to relief for aggrieved plaintiffs who
wish to engage in "the simple act of seeking, obtaining, or residing in
housing on a non-discriminatory basis." 26 1
Although Bloch II is undeniably encouraging to fair housing advo-
cates, a circuit court split still exists. Ultimately, resolution of the issue
should come from the Supreme Court or Congress. The Supreme Court
could grant certiorari to a post-acquisition discrimination case. However,
as one commentator noted, "a positive Supreme Court holding would
not likely address every relevant provision of the FHA.. . . Many provi-
sions of the FHA operate independently, and each applies in some post-
acquisition situations."26 2 Moreover, a favorable Supreme Court ruling
is not a certainty. Therefore, the most effective solution would be for
Congress to amend the Fair Housing Act, as it did over two decades ago,
when it passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.263 As part of
the amendments, Congress added language protecting housing rights of
disabled occupants. The amended statute makes it unlawful to "discrimi-
nate in the sale or rental, or to otherwise make unavailable or deny, a
dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of that buyer or
renter, [or] a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling
258. Id. at 782.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Oliveri, supra note 37, at 11.
262. Scott N. Gilbert, Comment, You Can Move In But You Can't Stay: To Protect Occupancy
Rights After Halprin, The Fair Housing Act Needs To Be Amended to Prohibit Post-Acquisition
Discrimination, 42 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 751, 782 (2009).
263. Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619-39 (1988).
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. . . ."264 The amended statute clearly encompasses rights for occupants
as well as home seekers. As Gilbert suggested, another series of amend-
ments to the FHA could add similar occupancy protection language to
the other § 3604 sections.2 65 For example, Gilbert suggested amending
§ 3604(b) by substituting "in connection with such dwelling" for "in
connection therewith."2 66 This and similar changes would "set the stage
by indicating that the FHA is concerned with what happens to the occu-
pant of a dwelling after the sale or rental transaction." 2 67
IX. CONCLUSION
Bloch II is, undoubtedly and justifiably, a relief to fair housing
advocates discouraged by Halprin and Cox. Nevertheless, the future of
the Fair Housing Act's application remains unclear. With the exception
of the Fifth Circuit, courts are generally in agreement that post-acquisi-
tion discrimination claims are actionable under the FHA. However,
courts were also in agreement before Halprin was decided, a factor that
did not stop the Seventh Circuit from swiftly narrowing the FHA's pro-
tections. Moreover, segregated housing remains a fact of life throughout
much of the United States,26 8 a clear sign that the Fair Housing Act's
goals remain unmet. With no final word or guidance from Congress or
the Supreme Court, there remains the possibility that one or more cir-
cuits will issue an opinion similar to Halprin and reject post-acquisition
causes of action. Therefore, although Bloch II has repaired some of the
damage caused by Halprin, the Fair Housing Act's protections remain
incomplete.
264. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(f) (2006) (emphasis added).
265. Gilbert, supra note 262, at 783-86.
266. Id. at 783.
267. Id. at 784.
268. See, e.g., Sugrue, supra note 16 (detailing a rise in racial segregation in the Detroit
metropolitan area). To compare segregation levels, or dissimilarity indices, in major metropolitan
areas and all fifty states, see New Racial Segregation Measures for States and Large Metropolitan
Areas: Analysis of the 2005-2009 American Community Survey, U. MICH. POPULATION STUDIES
CTR., http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/dis/census/segregation.html (last visited Sept. 4, 2011).
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